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The true purpose of mathematics education: A provocation 
 
David Kollosche1 
Pädagogische Hochschule Vorarlberg, Austria 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper features an anecdotic narration in which a fictive narrator, 
addressing the author of this paper, explains the functional role of mathematics education 
in the maintenance of the bureaucratic society. Drawing from critical philosophy and 
critical mathematics education, it is argued that the objective of mathematics education 
as realised in schools is to teach students to understand, accept, follow or at least ignore 
pre-defined rules as they are required for the bureaucratic administration of modern 
society. The theory of the narrator is underpinned with explanations that students 
offered in an interview study conducted by the author. Rather than supporting his 
alternative theory on a strict methodical basis, the narrator illustrates its explanatory 
strength in its confrontation with the experiences of students. The ‘provocation’ does not 
only lie with the narrator’s theory about the nature of mathematics education but with 
the fact that reality, as it is presented by the students, fits in all too well with the 
narrator’s explanations. 
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Prelude 
 
Well, David, what can we trust in? What can we trust in, once the indisputable holiness 
of the king has been sacrificed by the dēmos, when the order of our gods is being 
questioned on the agorá, when our merchants bring the beliefs of others from over the 
seas? Who will now give us the hold to see and walk the path that leads us in safety? 
~ 
›It is the torment of the philosopher to be confused this way, and there is no other 
origin of philosophy.‹ — When Heinrich reads Plato, this is what Socrates says to 
Theaetetus. Here we see where the Athenian quest for knowledge, Socrates’s relentless 
search for the good, the good teacher, the good statesman, the good soldier, originated. 
It was a quest to overcome the confusion caused by the development of Ancient Greece 
and to find something new to provide a stable world view. Philosophy was born to 
answer the question what we can trust in.1 
~ 
›Fear not, for there is an existence which is not affected by fate and death.‹ — As 
Heinrich’s formula points out, this is the promise which the invention of truth by 
Parmenides provides us with: ›For it is unborn, also indestructible, whole, unique, 
motionless‹; ›it is not allowed to become or vanish.‹2 
~ 
What is Parmenides’ demand to believe in an ever-reliable entity but the introduction 
of an empty signifier which materialises our desire for stability? And what is his 
demand but one of the first disciplinary techniques? Find yourself a way to believe in 
truth, or, Parmenides tells us, you will end up as the ›double-headed: For helplessness 
leads their wandering sense in their breast; and they drift, deaf equally and blind, lost in 
confused wonder, a bunch unable to decide, considering being and not being as the 
same and again as not the same.‹3 
~ 
So, David, let’s not be double-headed! Let’s not think in terms of becoming and 
vanishing. Where does this lead us? Something can only be if something else is not. 
Contradiction is born alongside the urge to avoid it. Either or, true or false, Black or 
White, man or woman: we order our world along such contradictions.  
~ 
The ontological question to which deduction gives an answer is: How are all these 
states of being, how are all our little truths related to that ›unique‹ idea of truth? 
Anaximander’s proposition that truths are interconnected by being grounded on other 
truths from which they can be derived by deduction, connects them just perfectly to 
that super-truth from which, eventually, all can be deduced. Just as the gods bequeathed 
their traits to their offspring, the polygon bequeaths its properties to the triangle, the 
natural number to the prime number, the continuous function to the differentiable 
function.4 
~ 
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Which is the discipline that is free enough from any realistic interpretation so that it 
can think of concepts totally stable in meaning and fulfilling of our demands for the 
identification of true and false, for the exclusion of contradictions and undecidedness, 
and for the organisation of statements in deductive relationships? Is not the strictness 
of mathematics, which shows in its imperative to define every concept and to prove 
every statement, the most extreme of all thinkable attempts to withhold the possibility 
of contradiction and undecidedness and to establish an indisputable and always-reliable 
truth?5 
 
 
Social order and education 
 
Hahaha, I laugh my ass off when I hear people say that learning maths was important 
for life. Maths isn’t, but what it does with us is. Yet of course, this belief itself is part of 
the game. 
~ 
Just look at the different stories about the nature of mathematics education that you tell 
yourselves in research! Do they allow describing what really happens in the 
mathematics classroom? No? Well then, let me tell you the true purpose of mathematics 
education! Only promise not you judge me too hastily, and you will see the integrity of 
my explanation.6 
~ 
David, you will want to audiotape me instead of taking these shattered notes. — Why, 
of course you will want to write down what I have to say. Never again will I be that 
honest! 
~ 
Let’s get the morals straight! Without social order there would be anarchy, and along 
with it misery, starvation, violence, disease and much more. So, social order is 
necessary. Pre-historic regimes and the despotic regimes of modernity, which see the 
pre-historic god-kings reincarnate, secured order by the threat of physical violence, 
securing control through the permanent threat against the bodies of you and your 
beloved. But who wants to be governed through violence today? Western society 
cultivated a less violent form of governance. 
~ 
Aristotle was clear in saying that logic was the tool of the dēmos for governing society 
on the agorá. Now that everybody wants to be part of the dēmos and the whole country 
is the agorá, how can we establish social order without the permanent threat of 
violence? Foucault saw it through. We need discourses which people submit to 
willingly and which have the potential to reach social decisions. And which discourse 
would be more persuasive than the one whose objects never change, whose truths are 
always reliable and which allows for no contradiction or undecidedness?7 
~ 
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What are our everyday decisions — epic and broad, or casual and hardly notable? The 
modern man is a bureaucrat. With bureaucrat I do not only mean those who sit in an 
office but, in Weber’s sense, everybody who developed a certain state of mind, who 
follows a specific pattern of behaviour. To some extent, we all are involved in reducing 
the chaos of human concerns to cases, thereby acknowledging selected and pre-fixed 
extracts of the situations while ignoring others, and retaining the truth of a case along 
pre-defined rules against its vividness in its individual net of becoming and vanishing.8 
~ 
Of course, mathematics can play an essential role in such processes, as research on 
organised calculation shows. But the connection between mathematics and bureaucracy 
lies on a deeper level of mutual integration. One the one hand, what is mathematisation 
but the reduction of a chaotic situation to the stability of a mathematical case? What is 
the solution of the mathematical problem but the bureaucratic, rule-bound dealing with 
that case? On the other hand, what is bureaucracy but the realisation of the 
mathematical logic in the spheres of human affairs? To process a case alongside rules 
which are made to avoid all contradiction and undecidedness is to create in the form of 
truth the necessity of an otherwise disputable decision on the basis of pure deduction.9 
~ 
Some people might consider the ignorance of the uniqueness of each situation as a loss 
of the specific. But this ignorance is, to borrow an Orwellian formula, strength. As 
Fischer points out: ›Reduction constitutes the usefulness of mathematics. One would 
not need the abstraction if one could consider everything. Oblivion is necessary, 
especially when it comes to decisions. He who considers everything never finishes and 
therefore cannot decide.‹ Beware of the double-headed!10 
~ 
When it comes to education, what kind of person needs to be produced to keep this 
social order intact? She has to be able and willing to perceive the world in pre-defined 
cases and to reach decisions by following pre-defined rules. In the Parmenidian 
tradition, this administration is ›motionless, it is not allowed to become or vanish‹, it is, 
to quote Weber, ›dehumanised‹: The ideal bureaucrat acts ›without hate and passion, 
hence without love and enthusiasm, under the pressure of plain notions of duty, in 
ignorance of the reputation of the person‹. The ideal bureaucrat is a computer.11 
~ 
As Horkheimer and Adorno observe, this peace has its price: ›Not only is domination 
paid for with the estrangement of human beings from the dominated objects, but the 
relationships of human beings, including the relationship of individuals to themselves, 
have themselves been bewitched by the objectification of mind. Individuals shrink to 
the nodal points of conventional reactions and the modes of operation objectively 
expected of them.‹12 
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Why mathematics education? 
 
Why learn mathematics? — Because you need all these concepts and procedures to 
solve your problems in later life? Stop kidding! — Because school prepares you for the 
few you will need? Too ineffective! — Because you learn to think logically? There is no 
proof and no indication of that. — Because you learn to solve problems in general? No 
proof either. Why on earth? 
~ 
Let’s assume an affirmative answer to Skovsmose’s questions: ›Could it be that ‘normal’ 
students in fact learn ‘something’, although not strictly speaking mathematics, and that 
this ‘something’ serves an important social function? If we look back again at the 10,000 
commandments,‹ directed at the student over years of her life in the form of 
mathematical problems to solve, ›what do they look like? They might have some 
similarities with those routine tasks, which are found everywhere in production and 
administration. An accountant has to do sums day after day. A laboratory assistant has 
to do a series of routine tasks in a careful way. Things have to be handled carefully and 
correctly in a pre-described way. Could it be that the school mathematics tradition is a 
well-functioning preparation for a majority of students who come to serve in such job-
functions?‹13 
~ 
Is it by pure chance that the introduction of mathematics as a compulsory discipline in 
school in the so-called Western countries of the early 20th century coincides with the 
proliferation of white-collar work in eventually all spheres of society? 
~ 
Please, let go of your fantasy! For the rest of our conversation admit that mathematics 
education is not for learning mathematics, but that learning mathematics is but a means 
to a different end! Over days, weeks, months and years it gives you the opportunity to 
create yourself as the logico-bureaucratic subject, and it gives us the opportunity to 
judge your ability and willingness to be this subject. 
~ 
You know, it is funny that you allowed me to have a glance on what your interviewed 
German ninth graders said about their relation to mathematics. Unlike you, I was not at 
all surprised by the fact that none of your 23 students reported that they experience 
your miraculous inquiry-based learning. Have the teacher explain the stuff, then 
practice it — this is the way it ought to be, as you will come to understand. Just allow 
me to use your students’ narratives in order to show you that my narration is not 
utopian but has its place in the experiences of those who live in the mathematics 
classroom!14 
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Being the bureaucratic subject 
 
›Well, the biggest difference is that in football you move and in maths you only sit.‹ — 
Daniel reminds us of bodily experiences that are so basic that they are often forgotten 
when we talk about mathematics education. The nurse, the timber worker, the football 
player move; but the office clerk, the telephonist, the researcher and to a large extend 
even the policeman and the teacher, virtually all who contribute to the administration 
of our society, have to sit. So let us see if you can be a sitter!15 
~  
›Too much writing. Yes, there is too much written on the blackboard. I have the opinion 
that it could be done shorter.‹ — Yes it could, dear Franziska, but then we would never 
know how long you can endure writing. And in your future job as a bureaucrat, you 
will sit and write. — I just hope that the mathematics classroom will eventually undergo 
the modernisation that the office has gone through years ago: The bureaucrat of today 
does not write on paper but type on the keyboard and click on the mouse. And so will 
the learner of mathematics. 
~ 
›You have to be willing to learn and when applying it you have to stay concentrated.‹ — 
We should not underestimate Rebecca’s thought. Concentration needs to be kept at a 
high level which might become increasingly difficult during a long day in school or in 
the office, especially if you have to solve the same problems following the same rules 
over and over again. So Daniel reports: ›The calculations are also quite long every time, 
and most of us don’t feel like it anymore.‹ 
~ 
Boredom is one of the most central experiences of the mathematics classroom: You 
yearn for something else and the world beyond the classroom is full of enticement. The 
same goes for the bureaucrat: You will not enjoy handling the seventeenth case of the 
day, nor writing another report. Nevertheless, you have to follow the prescribed rules 
delicately, and therefore you will need to ›stay concentrated‹. You have to bring 
yourself forth as a subject that finds calculating, as Emma puts it, ›endurable‹.16 
~ 
The question not only is whether you are able to endure this abstract rule-following, 
but whether you are willing to. And there are good reasons why you would not be 
willing. 
~ 
›In maths there is only right or wrong. In German you can always write something and 
something correct results from it, but not so in maths. So you do not have this variety 
and there is only black and white. There is simply no in-between, nothing you can talk 
your way out with.‹ — The logical order is merciless. Its dehumanised mechanics 
expects everybody to obtain the same result; this is the imperative of the law of 
identity. A wrong turn here or there and you produce the wrong number, hold the 
wrong statement true, reach the wrong decision. But what is Ute’s ›in-between‹? 
~ 
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›In maths there are simply tasks that you have to calculate, and there is nothing 
personal in it.‹ — As for Wiebke, the possibility to act out one’s individuality is largely 
limited in the mathematics classroom. If self-actualization indeed is, as Maslow 
concludes, the highest form of human needs, then this limitation cannot but result in 
unwillingness. Or, to let Helena and Vanessa speak: ›Many students like to talk and to 
say their opinion, but you don’t need that in maths.‹ — ›I like to draw and find it good 
to be creative and to express myself. In maths there are all the formulas and you are 
somewhat constrained. That’s not my thing.‹17 
 
 
Becoming the bureaucratic subject 
 
Come on, everybody join the maths run! No, we won’t stop for you, not even slow 
down. So don’t fall behind, don’t lose us out of sight, or you shall be lost! And if 
somebody leaves a light for you to follow, you’ll have to run, run as fast as you can, 
with nothing around you but the hope to close up! 
~ 
Asked whether she thinks that mathematics classes teach anything else than pure 
calculation techniques, Julia replies: ›You learn to learn.‹ — And is it a coincidence that 
mathēmatikḗ tékhnē, the Greek expression from which the word mathematics 
originated, literally means ›the art of learning‹? 
~ 
Why is mathematics so difficult to learn? Bianca argues: ›Actually it doesn’t have that 
much to do with maths but rather with the character of the people, because if you’re 
really endeavoured to learn something new you usually can understand it rather 
quickly, but if you think »Okay, the teacher had his chance and messed it up, so I seal 
myself off completely«, that does not get you anywhere.‹ 
~ 
Why is mathematics so difficult to learn? ›Maybe because the head is being burdened 
too much, more than in other subjects like geography. There, it is only memorising 
most of the time.‹ — But what is it that burdens Quinn’s head? Is it not true to say that 
learning mathematics requires a way of reasoning, be it logical, bureaucratic or 
something else, which is not commonly used in everyday thinking? Is it not true that 
instead of merely accumulating and reproducing knowledge you have to become 
someone else, or, to speak in Foucauldian terms, you have to develop a new conduct of 
the self, a different subjectivity? 
~  
›Well, I do not want to count myself among those who have understood, because 
usually this is not the case. This is also a bit up to me, as personally I have some 
difficulties to generally pay attention in class, especially so in maths, because I often 
don’t understand and also, I don’t find it that interesting.‹ — Yes, Helena, the question 
of concentration is haunting us. And yet, is the ability to concentrate not necessary if 
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you are being explained new definitions of cases and new rules for reaching decisions? 
Complicated as these might be, they have to be learnt and applied accurately, requiring 
a focussed mind. 
~ 
Where else than in mathematics would we find procedures so abstracted from our 
reality that we can fully concentrate on following the pre-defined rules, where else 
could we so easily forget the specificity of reality, where else could we so easily 
conduct ourselves in a ›dehumanised‹ manner? 
~ 
›Well, if you ask for the first time, she explains it to the whole class. But if somebody 
still hasn’t understood and asks again, she does become a little irritated and so. Then 
she is always stressed out and explains no more. And then, of course, some people still 
haven’t understood.‹ — Good teacher. The mathaton doesn’t stop, doesn’t even slow 
down. In office, you will have to understand instructions quickly, and it is utterly 
ineffective to have people sitting there who regularly require special attention. So, you 
learn quickly or you’re out. That’s why Helena’s teacher is a good teacher: She teaches 
her students that the occasions for explanation are limited and that they have to 
understand quickly. Ute has successfully adjusted: ›Now, in maths, I always listen, 
because I know that otherwise I won’t stand a chance. If you miss class only once, then 
actually you can forget it completely, then you never need to come back.‹ 
~ 
Teacher explanations just like any instructions are necessarily incomplete and 
ambiguous. You would prefer learners who know what you mean, who have the right 
feeling to add what you don’t say, to choose from an array of possible understandings 
the appropriate one. This ability, of course, depends on the familiarity with the kind of 
thinking that is cultivated here. To a large extent, it depends on the knowledge we 
already have in the area, be it mathematics or administration: solutions to exemplary 
problems, specific procedures, experiences of how to formulate problems and establish 
cases, eventually everything that provides points of reference for our understanding. 
However, shifting from elementary mathematics to the contents of middle school, these 
points of reference are less frequently found in out-of-school experience and more 
frequently constituted by knowledge from previous teaching. Here it is where you do 
not only have to combine all your knowledge, but where gaps in knowledge become 
disastrous if you are unable to fill them yourself. Or, to let Helena explain: ›It is more 
complicated and more formulas and, yes, you somehow have to know and combine 
everything at once. And that is difficult of course, especially when you have gaps, just 
like I unfortunately have.‹ 
~ 
As Rebecca reminds us, the understanding of new concepts and procedures is also aided 
by a more general knowledge of the universal order of thought: ›Some people simply 
don’t understand. They cannot see and grasp connections, so they cannot connect it 
logically‹. — Whatever that logic that might be, logic in the strict sense of creating and 
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upholding the always identical, of avoiding contradictions and undecidedness, of 
justifying statements through deduction, or the logic of bureaucratic administration 
with its reduction of situations to cases, its handling of cases along pre-defined rules 
and its exclusion of all individual commiseration, it is following a code of speech and 
thought which does not derive from shared experiences but builds on hegemonic, 
dehumanised rules. And isn’t it Bernstein’s heritage to have shown the unequal access 
to such universalised principles of the organisation of thought?18 
 
 
Why to become the bureaucratic subject 
 
Why does it work? Why should anyone be glad to become the bureaucratic subject?  
~ 
Certainly, to our all benefit, there are students who do like to calculate and to simply 
follow rules. How is that possible, you may want to ask, if humans are striving for self-
actualization which the bureaucratic machine denies them? Maslow considers self-
actualization the highest need, pursued only if a variety of other needs are satisfied, 
including the needs for security, morality, belonging, achievement and respect of 
others. What if following rules and finding the correct results are the easiest or even the 
only visible way of feeling immune against decay, of knowing what is right, of 
belonging somewhere, of proving competent or of experiencing appreciation? 
~ 
Horkheimer and Adorno compiled a history of great thinkers who enjoyed to subject 
themselves to a deity they themselves created, to the manifestation of the promise that 
there is an existence beyond the fallibility and evanescence of humankind, an existence 
that therefore is unhuman and has to materialise itself in the very same way for every 
observer. This worship is shared by the Parmenidean search for truth, by the Socratic 
quest for the good, by the Aristotelean logic as well as by Bacon’s modern empiricism, 
by the Cartesian ratio, by Leibniz’ characteristica universalis, and, of course, by the 
bureaucratic and mathematical methods in general.19 
~ 
We should not underestimate the comfort of competence! The body caged in the 
classroom, the mind may still exclude itself from or immerse itself into the 
mathematical discourse. And if it does immerse itself and achieves success, what a bliss 
not only to gain access to a timeless truth, but to have yourself attested more competent 
than others, with the prospect of reproducing this superiority over years to come! 
Laura: ›Maths is fun for me because one is very glad if one calculates the formula and 
it’s right. You get a sheet and you have the opportunity to calculate something. I believe 
for some students maths is kind of a race, they want to win it. When you sit here in 
class, everybody calculates and when you got it, of course you are glad.‹ 
~ 
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The mindless but rule-bound operation with symbols may produce an enjoyment of its 
own kind in form of an experience which psychology calls ›flow‹. For Rebecca, ›maths 
is for relaxing, like headphones-on or dancing.‹20 
~ 
›I feel good when I explained something to somebody and he has understood.‹ —
Rebecca’s experience points to an even deeper experience: Instead of only mastering the 
exclusive techniques of mathematics and allying with the eternal and ever-present, you 
have the power to grant others that mastery and alliance. 
~ 
On the other side, as Laura adds, the threat of failure is always present as a 
motivational force in the mathematics classroom: ›It is stupid if you can’t do maths, if 
you don’t master it. It is simply embarrassing.‹ 
~ 
›Whether you are building a playing ground outside or somehow planting a flowerbed 
or generally do anything, you always have to somehow think mathematically in order 
to somehow get things done how they are planned.‹ — David, you have already 
discussed the ideology of the relevance which not only Wiebke here, but nearly all of 
your students assign to mathematics, how this is one-sidedly directed at learning, at 
learning a set of specific mathematical techniques, especially techniques of elementary 
mathematics, and how students fail to connect this discourse with their experiences in 
the mathematics classroom. Why then does this discourse, which Dowling rightfully 
describes as myths of mathematics education, unfold such a dominance in our 
perception?21 
~ 
›You simply can’t be bothered with it, because with some exercises you think that you 
won’t ever need that again. Because none of us wants to study something with maths 
later. And that’s why it sometimes appears so senseless, and you do not understand 
why you should do that now.‹ Emma’s point appears to contradict Wiebke’s, but in 
your interviews you can see that most students hold both positions. Why do they 
uphold this paradox discourse? Well, these students ignore the utopian character of the 
discourse around the relevance of mathematics in a Lacanian ›as if‹ behaviour: 
Although students know that the mathematics they learn is useless, they choose to 
participate in the discourse which attributes practical relevance to mathematics 
education, thus allowing them to enjoy learning mathematics as a meaningful 
activity.22 
~ 
The lack of explanation of the relevance of mathematics is a condition of the possibility 
of mathematics education. As proclaiming that mathematics education prepares and 
selects you to uphold the dehumanised, routinized administration of our society is 
considered politically incorrect in light of the liberal call for an emancipative education, 
cultivating a pseudo-discourse, which at the end of the day reveals mathematics 
education as a senseless activity, is the best you can do. For the senselessness of 
  TME, vol. 15, nos. 1&2, p. 313 
 
learning mathematics reflects the absence of meaning in any link of the bureaucratic 
chain; sense is subsumed under the mechanics of the dehumanised machine. Only in 
open confrontation with this senselessness the student can develop the ability and 
willingness to perform the bureaucratic act. 
~ 
Eventually, some students such as Venessa are even grateful, for mathematics education 
makes them obtain a valuable qualification that they would not pursue voluntarily. 
Asked if she would put maths in her self-made timetable, she explains: ›Probably so, 
because you simply need it for later life. I believe I wouldn’t do maths on my own 
accord and this is how I would force myself to do it.‹ 
 
 
The productivity of failure 
 
Now I talked a lot about those who become subjects to mathematical and bureaucratic 
thinking. What about those who don’t? Obviously, they pose a threat. In their inability 
or unwillingness to follow mathematical procedures and bureaucratic regulation, they 
might eventually attack our social order as conceptually over-simplified in its 
opposition of right and wrong, hypocritical in its claim for objectivity and justness, 
inhumane for its abetters and ignorant of individual uniqueness. In lack of a just 
alternative for the organisation of society they threaten us with chaos, they are the 
›double-headed‹ who are ›lost in confused wonder‹ and ›unable to decide‹ that 
Parmenides warns us about. Luckily, mathematics education has approved mechanisms 
to deal with this menace. 
~ 
Just imagine the psychology of the repeated experience of not understanding in a 
situation which you cannot avoid, which you are bound to by law! — ›You can also 
despair when you are sitting there all the time, never finding the solution.‹ — Laura’s 
despair might eventually erupt to more intense feelings towards the learning of 
mathematics as in the case of Anna: ›Sometimes I’m sad because I again didn’t 
understand. And I’m also somewhat afraid that the others will laugh at me because it 
was easy for them. That the others think that you’re stupid. One girl even cried.‹ 
~ 
›Well, a result of this could be that later they can’t be bothered with maths at all, 
because they connect it with something negative.‹ — Simon hits the point. Despair and 
anxiety are part of the productivity of failure. In the form of the Foucauldian 
internalisation of forms of conduct, learning to despair when facing mathematics 
motivates an attitude of avoidance or anxiety towards mathematics, eventually leading 
to a mentality that dares not question the dehumanised processing of human affairs. 
Skovsmose understood: ›A large group of students might be left, and they will have 
learned a substantial lesson: that mathematics is not for them. To silence a group of 
people in this way might also serve a socio-political and economic function.‹23 
~ 
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Laura explains how her classmates learned to perceive mathematics as something 
unpleasant: ›I believe they think that they do not understand it. Maths gives you that, 
this feeling that maybe you did not immediately understand. Many of them then leave 
the classroom thinking: »Wow, what did I actually understand? Nothing!« Then, when 
you are left with this and when you take an exam and get a bad mark and it always 
goes on like that, I believe then you stop enjoying maths.‹ 
~ 
In the mathematical world where the quality of every statement can be reduced to right 
and wrong, and that necessarily without any disagreement between different observers, 
success and failure are most easy to determine, mathematics is used, as Socrates had 
described long ago, as an indicator of intellectual ability. The inability to obtain the 
right result in any procedure comes to represent a general flaw of the subject’s 
thinking, its disconnectedness from truth. This is the way in which Anna fears to be 
labelled as ›stupid‹ or the reason why Ute has learnt to mistrust her intellect: ›What do 
I lack? Well, logical thinking sometimes. Occasionally I’m actually good in spatial 
thinking but as soon as it has to do with numbers I lack it.‹ 
~ 
Social narratives about mathematical ability, be they gendered, ethnical, based on socio-
economic background or on whatever else, prove supportive for this technique of self-
exclusion. Even though Ute is aware of the flaws of such explanations, she locates her 
problems in mathematics following such a rationale: ›We are in any case a rather 
language-oriented family. Actually nobody there was every good at maths. I believe 
that it’s really like that: If, from one moment on, you’re always telling yourself or being 
told that you can’t do it anyway, also by teachers and your environment, or when your 
whole environment is not that engaged, then it’s also not too bad if you’re not that 
good yourself, then the expectations are not that high.‹ 
~ 
The mechanisms that lead those students who are not able or willing to participate in 
mathematical and bureaucratic thinking to despair are well supported by the 
disciplinary techniques which teachers use to conduct the classroom. Humiliation as 
experienced by Anna, although admittedly unpleasant for both the teacher and the 
student, might be the most effective of these techniques: ›She just calls up somebody. 
Also those who do not want. Then, when I cannot do it, I do feel exposed in front of the 
class. Often I learn at home and try to understand, but I don’t. Then, she could well help 
me and not desert me like that.‹ 
~ 
Eventually, just like with any normative pair of contrasting concepts as Foucault has 
shown us, the inability or unwillingness to learn and follow the abstracted procedure of 
mathematics creates the idea of a lack in mathematical intellect, more generally in 
logical thought or even in thought in general, in the first place. However, this disability, 
which manifests itself in bad marks or dropped courses, is a requirement, firstly to 
encourage students, who do not want to be labelled intellectually disabled, to become 
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the bureaucratic subject, and secondly to publicly justify the exclusion of sceptics from 
critical positions in society. Here, we also find the second reason for the narrative that 
mathematics was taught in order to learn elementary mathematical skills which are 
needed in later life: Following this belief, failure in mathematics proves your intellectual 
inability and your dependency on experts. The sceptics have learnt to bend down; social 
order is saved. 
 
 
Research in mathematics education 
 
Before I come to an end, let me say a few conclusive words about the role that the so-
called research in mathematics education plays in this system. You will have to admit 
that mathematics education first of all is a pedagogic discipline which is well described 
by Bernfeld: ›The great pedagogues feel for the child: affection, love, pity, hope, disgust, 
terror. And this, their feeling, their personal reaction to existence, is for them the 
problem, is for them the pivot of their science, is their instrument of observation. They 
do not see the child as it is but ultimately only the child and themselves, each in 
relation to the other. And if they were able to abstract from themselves, they would not 
be interested in how the child is in itself but only how something else would be formed 
out of it. The child is the means for a theological, ethical, socio-utopian goal.‹ — Is this 
mentality not reflected in the quest to educate the logical thinker, mathematical 
modeller or general problem-solver?24 
~ 
The all-pervasive rhythm of explanation and exercise, the domination of routinized 
procedures and the total absence of any experiences of becoming a logical thinker, 
mathematical modeller or problem-solver in your students’ narratives show the failure 
of the pedagogical endeavour. Whence this schism between the dream of the theorist 
and classroom practice? Lundin already gave the answer: This quest for reform is but a 
camouflage which legitimises mathematics education as the emancipative institution it 
is supposedly able to become, and through its ignorance of the socio-political 
mechanics of the classroom it secures its ever-present bureaucratic nature without 
having to formulate it as the anti-liberal project which it is.25 
~ 
The ignorance towards the social function of mathematics education, that is the 
preparation of a bureaucratic workforce and the legitimisation of the bureaucratic 
government of society, is its condition of possibility. It is not only manifest in the 
ideological camouflage of educational goals and the role of research which legitimise 
mathematics education in the first place, but operates through every student. The 
student, who has to be ignorant of what is to be learned in order not to protest against 
it, cannot explain failure. Why does Helena fail? ›Because I have difficulties to 
understand it. Why? Um, actually I don’t know exactly. It doesn’t seem to suit me well. 
Well, I really don’t know.‹ 
~ 
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›I already got better marks in maths, because he really waits and doesn’t continue until 
everybody has understood. And that’s really good for the whole class.‹ — For the 
support of your idealistic ideology of the purpose of mathematics education, it is only 
too good that there are always some teachers who reignite our hope for a better 
education. Gina’s teacher, possibly a real master of his art, and his class might enjoy 
this style of teaching, and for many of you researchers he might be the shining proof 
that change for the better is indeed possible. But at the end of the day, neither do we 
need everybody to become a bureaucratic thinker, nor will waiting-for-everybody annul 
the fact that some students are more fit and eager to think bureaucratically than others. 
~ 
Eventually, there are also students who support your idealistic ideology of the purpose 
of mathematics education: ›I would really like to not only have one way which is 
always written in the book (how you get there, so to say), the way we always 
extrapolate ourselves through logical contemplation. Only that perhaps you have a 
second way, because, as the saying goes, there are several roads leading to Rome. And 
that you really let the students contemplate on how you get there, really this logical 
contemplation. It is really important, in many subjects and also generally.‹ — Oh 
Bianca, what shall we do with that creative mastery of yours? Luckily, our society also 
needs those who define the limits of the cases and the rules for their handling which 
others face as pre-defined; luckily, we also need the rule-makers. Just like protagonist 
Bernard in Huxley’s Brave New World, she who understands the mechanics which rule 
society all too well, cannot follow them anymore and craves for alternatives, is 
rewarded with being exiled to an island which is crowded by like-minded who rule the 
world. Only that Bianca’s island is situated right in our midst. 
~ 
Thank you for your attention! Haha, what an intimate presentation! Sorry, I have to get 
going now. — Yes, I’m really serious. Just think about it! 
 
 
1  The quotation is a translation of Socrates’s statement ›Μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, 
τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη‹ from Plato Theaetetus 155d. Unlike 
common English translators such as Jowett (Plato, 1892) and Fowler (Plato, 1921) who translate 
páthos as feeling and thaumázein as wonder, Heinrich (1981/1987), whose translation is 
followed here, allows for a deeper interpretation by sticking closer to the original text and 
translating páthos as torment (Leiden) and thaumázein as confusion. The interpretation of the 
origins of Greek philosophy is presented in Vernant (1962/1982). 
2  The first quotation is a translation of a fictional proclamation which Heinrich (1981/1987), a 
German philosopher who discussed the origins of philosophy and logic on the basis of 
Marxism and Freudian psychoanalysis, presents to escalate his psychosocial interpretation of 
the introduction of the concept of truth to philosophy by the pre-Socratic scholar Parmenides. 
The second and third quotations are translations of the description of truth in Parmenides 
(2009, pp. 19, 21). 
3  The quotation is a translation of a description in Parmenides (2009, p. 17). Disciplinary 
techniques, in the sense of Foucault (1975/1979), are techniques for the conduct of the self 
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whose development is motivated by external demands, eventually leading to an internalisation 
of these originally external demands. Here, the threat to be expelled as a ›double-headed‹ 
motivates readers to subject to logical thinking. 
4  The narrator refers to Anaximander (2007) who introduced the concept of cause to philosophy 
and presented the oldest recorded cosmology that does not refer to gods. The spiritual 
interpretation of Anaximander’s work builds on Heinrich (1981/1987). 
5  Kollosche (2013; 2014) provides a sociological interpretation of the development of logic in 
Ancient Greece under consideration of mathematics education. 
6  Different narratives about social functions of mathematics education are discussed in 
Kollosche (2016). 
7  The narrator first refers to Aristotle’s Prior analytics (1989, 52b–53a), then to Foucault’s 
(1975/1979) concept of disciplinary techniques. 
8  The narrator refers to Weber (1972) who, in the first years of sociology, provided a profound 
description of the social and mental mechanisms of bureaucracy. 
9  Research in organized calculation is a young field of study established in Germany by Vollmer 
(2004) and analysing the use of mathematics in decision-making processes in big institutions. 
The connections between bureaucracy and calculation are discussed by Kollosche (2014; 2015). 
10  The narrator is first referring to the formula ›ignorance is strength‹ from Orwell’s novel 
Nineteen eighty-four (1949) and then citing the Austrian mathematics educator Fischer (2006, 
p. 42). 
11  The last two quotations are the narrator’s translation of Weber (1972, p. 129)  
12  Citation from the Dialectic of Enlightenment (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1944/2002, p. 21). 
13  The narrator is citing from Skovsmose (2005, pp. 11–12). 
14  The narrator refers to data that was collected in an interview study with 23 students from the 
area in and around Berlin, Germany. The students attended the eighth, ninth or tenth grade 
and different school tracks. They came from different schools and were randomly chosen to 
participate in a voluntary semi-structured interview about their general relationship to 
mathematics, including questions such as ›What is your favourite subject and what do you 
like about it? How does it differ from maths?‹ and ›Are there situations in mathematics where 
you feel particularly good or bad?‹ The interviews were transscribed and the narrator had 
access to them. 
15  Citations which are accompanied by first names refer to specific interviewees. All names have 
been changed preserving gender. The citations have been translated into English and 
sometimes parts of the statements have been omitted or linguistically smoothened without 
rendering their meaning. 
16  The experience of mathematics as boring is a phenomenon that has been repeatedly reported 
by students in empirical studies from different Western countries (Kislenko, Grevholm, and 
Lepik, 2007; Lange, 2009; Kollosche, 2017). 
17  The narrator is referring to the hierarchy of human needs as presented by the US-American 
psychologist Maslow (1943). 
18  The narrator is referring to Bernstein’s (1965/1971) work on elaborated versus restricted codes 
of communication. 
19  The narrator is referring to Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944/2002). 
20  The mental state of flow was first described by Csíkszentmihályi (1975). 
21  The narrator is referring to one of my other publications (Kollosche, in press). 
22  As Žižek (1994) explains, the psychoanalyst Lacan showed that people can act ‘as if’ an illusion 
was real although they already know that it is not. 
23  Skovsmose (2005, p. 12) is cited here. 
24  The narrator is citing a translated passage of Siegfried Bernfeld’s (1925/1979) psychoanalytical 
analysis of pedagogy (pp. 36–37). 
25  The narrator is referring to the work of Lundin (2012). 
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